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The advent of the Internet has radically transformed the way in which images of 
fine art can be viewed by much of the world.  One of Amedeo Modigliani’s rarely seen 
portraits of Jeanne Hébuterne, an oil-on-canvas painting done in 1919, can be seen on the 
website Artnet.com.1  It can also be seen in a photograph of a Christie’s porter handling 
the original painting on the Getty Images’ website.2  And, since the painting did not sell 
for the auction’s reserve, or minimum, sale price, the painting is presumably back with 
the owners who put it up for auction, and can be seen in person at their home.  
The image of Edgar Degas’ Dancers in Blue, a pastel work done in the late 1890s, 
can be seen on the Corbis website,3 as well as on a poster sales website4 that is 
advertising the image.  Or, to view this work in person, one could visit the Pushkin 
Museum in Moscow.5  New technology is constantly challenging human perceptions of 
how and whether a new mechanism for a traditional activity is permissible in society.  
The manner in which the law translates new technology can be awkward and contentious.  
This writing will examine how and whether various types of images can be viewed and 
1
 Artnet.com reports on the selling prices of certain pieces of art that have been put up for auction.  See
http://www.artnet.com/Auction/AuctionsOnLineDetail_Preview.asp?LotID=2911902&Page=1&T=9&AUI
D=26938 (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
2 See www.gettyimages.com.  To find this particular image, type in “Christie’s” in the search engine.  Getty 
Images’ inventory of images is not permanent.  This image was last viewed Feb. 24, 2004.
3 See www.corbis.com.  To find this particular image, type in “Degas” in the search engine.  Like Getty 
Images’ inventory of images, Corbis’ inventory is not permanent.  This particular image was last viewed 
Feb. 24, 2004. 
4 See Picassomio Art Posters, Danseuses en Bleue, available at 
http://www.picassomio.com/posters/c1013,c10996,c12558/en/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
2used in non-traditional formats, and address some of the issues for which domestic and 
international laws have needed to adjust their traditional tenets.
This topic is extremely broad and complex.  A large portion of the intersecting 
interests between the Internet, fine art and technology regards the doctrine of fair use in 
copyright law, which provides a legal defense to the usage of copyrighted works for 
purposes of education, for example.  Whether a copyrighted online image could be used 
for a professor’s PowerPoint presentation would fall into this realm of inquiry.  This 
writing will focus on the rights and responsibilities the groups of people involved in 
online imagery; those who are depicted, those who create the image, those who own the 
copyright, those who own the original artwork itself, and those who view it.
To provide a framework in which to understand these issues, I will provide an 
outline in Part I of selected international copyright regimes.  In Part II, I will briefly touch 
on the importance of choice of law analyses, and will look at rights of privacy and rights 
of publicity in their historic context and will discuss new challenges that confront current 
laws in these domains in the context of the Internet.  In Part III, I will analyze moral 
rights as they are understood by various nations, and how they are being interpreted in 
tandem with the Internet.  In Part IV, I will discuss the opportunities and difficulties 
faced by advances in digital rights management.  In Part V, I will synthesize the prior 
analyses by means of the example of a single artist and, in Part VI, the conclusion, I will 
suggest that, while harmonization of international copyright law seems, a priori, the most 
beneficial plan for the future, there may be alternative systems that are more realistic and 
more beneficial.  The ideal system could provide clear rules to copyright holders as to 
5 See The Pushkin Museum, Art of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, available at 
http://www.museum.ru/gmii/defengl.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
3their bundle of rights in a given jurisdiction and how to enforce them, and preserve the 
deep-seated ideological underpinnings of copyright law in individual countries.  If 
harmonization does occur at some point, I would recommend that artist’s rights be an 
important part of the discussion.
I. International Copyright Regimes
Prior to the first international bilateral copyright treaty’s implementation in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, France called for a universal law of copyright.6  It was 
the case then, and still is today, that “[a]ll nations’ domestic laws reflect internal values, 
mores, and social conditions.  Copyright laws are no exception.”7  Although international 
copyright protection legislation still does not exist today, signatories to the Convention 
for the protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland, 
have increased steadily since the Convention’s inception.  The ten original signatory 
countries8 to the Convention comprised the Berne Union;9 an entity that exists apart from 
the treaty so that no Union member need adhere to any revisions of the Convention in 
order to remain Berne Union members.  There are currently 154 state members of the 
Berne Union.10
Essentially, the jurisdictional component of the Berne Convention, most recently 
revised in 1971, is based on a principle of national treatment, wherein a copyrighted work 
6 Paul Goldstein, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 143 (Foundation Press, 2001).
7
 Matt Jackson, Harmony or Discord?  The Pressure Toward Conformity in International Copyright, 43 
IDEA 607, 611 (2003).
8
 The original ten countries were Belgium, France, Germany, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Spain, Switzerland, 
Tunisia and the United Kingdom.  See id.
9
 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act of July 24, 1971, as 
amended on September 28, 1979, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo001en.htm.  
[hereinafter the Berne Convention] Art. 1 reads:  “The countries to which this Convention applies 
constitute a Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.”  Id.
10 See The Berne Convention, Contracting Parties, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/word/e-berne.doc (last visited Apr. 3, 2004).
4from any Berne Union country will be treated in any other country according to the 
latter’s copyright law.  For example, a French artwork that is infringed in Germany will 
be protected in Germany at least to the extent that a German work would be protected 
there.11  A tenet of the Berne Convention that has made it attractive to so many countries 
is its relative leniency insofar as it allows member States to maintain much autonomy in 
implementing the Convention and accommodates diversity in national laws.12  Another 
key element of the Berne Convention, at least insofar as the United States’ recent 
implementation of it is concerned, is its requirement of moral rights protection.  Article 
6bis of the Convention necessitates that the rights of paternity and integrity be guaranteed 
to copyright holders.  Broadly, this means that an artist, author, or other creator of a 
work, “shall have the right to claim authorship of the work.”13  The right of integrity 
provides that the author or artist has the right “to object to any distortion, mutilation or 
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which 
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”14
There are two primary perspectives about the “purpose of intellectual property 
protection…[they are] economic and moral.”15  As shall be discussed below, the United 
States has fallen much more on the side of economic than moral interests, despite its 
eventual implementation of the Berne Convention in 1988,16 while France, a bastion of 
author’s rights advocacy, falls on the moral side.  In even broader terms of socio-cultural 
11
 The Berne Convention, supra note 9.  Art. 5 of the Convention reads:  “Authors shall enjoy…in countries 
of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may 
hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.”  Id.
12
 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of 
Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST L.J. 733, 741-42 (2000).
13
 The Berne Convention, supra note 9, at Art. 6bis.
14 Id.
15
 Jackson, supra note 7.
5generalization, Western ideals are centered around the free market, individual rights and 
the idea that profits are the appropriate reward for creative endeavors, while other 
systems are more interested in the welfare of the community and equal distribution of 
wealth.17  Wide discrepancies in points of view about this aspect of copyright law explain 
the movement to harmonize copyright law on an international scale.  Harmonization 
through reduction of national legal disparities would ostensibly reduce the cost, time and 
incertitude involved in determining rights, thereby reducing obstacles to innovation and 
global trade.18
Short of harmonization, these discrepancies demonstrate an acute need to 
implement a clear structure whereby States with different views about moral rights can 
trust that their interests in protecting the intellectual property rights of their nationals are 
being satisfied.  Indeed, harmonization may be both impractical and undesirable.  An 
emphasis on harmonization may actually prevent individual countries from pursuing their 
own domestic policy agendas.19  Furthermore, copyright law “goes to the heart of a 
nation’s information and cultural policy because [it] influences the creation and 
distribution of knowledge and culture…. [I]t is no surprise that nations would resist 
giving up autonomy over their copyright policies.”20
II. Choice of Law
16 See the Berne Convention Implementation Act, available at 
http://www.cni.org/docs/infopols/US.Berne.Convention.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
17
 Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual Property Protection Debate: Are the North and 
South Arguing Past Each Other When We Say ‘Property’? A Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic 
Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 307, 321 (1996).
18
 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Integration of International and Domestic Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 
23 COLUM. VLA J.L. & ARTS 307, 312 (2000).
19
 Fred H. Cate, Introduction: Sovereignty and the Globalization of Intellectual Property, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEG. STUD. 1, 1-2 (1998).
20 See Jackson, supra note 7, at 643.
6In the United States, “[c]hoice of law issues have largely been ignored in past 
copyright decisions, with many courts apparently assuming without analysis that U.S. law 
applies to determine ownership and infringement for foreign nationals.”21  Insofar as 
choice of law is an issue, Berne Union States must agree that the national law of 
infringement will be applied uniformly to foreign and domestic authors and artists, as 
described above.  Both procedural and substantive differences in copyright laws may 
make choice of laws questions determinative of the outcome in a given case.  For 
example, as a default rule, copyright for Berne Union members lasts for 50 years after the 
death of the author or artist,22 but individual countries have an option to provide longer 
protection.  In European Community countries, artists rights societies and pay-per-view 
lobbies have succeeded in raising this duration to 70 years after the artist’s death.23  The 
determination of the length of a work’s copyright protection is a different number of 
years in different countries, illustrating how choice of law is of paramount importance.
Choice of law in copyright disputes is, at best, “a work in progress.”24  Any given 
copyright case will involve a number of factors that determine whose law should be 
applied, including meanings of originality and ownership, and conceptual questions such 
as the scope of applicable subject matter.   While an in-depth discussion of choice of law 
issues is beyond the scope of this writing, it is essential to note that it is an extremely 
important but unclear area of law whose boundaries and parameters have not yet been 
21
 Mark V.B. Partridge, Choice of Law in International Copyright Disputes, Pattishall, McAullife, 
Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson, 1998.
22
 Berne Convention, supra note 9, Art. 7.
23 See Council Directive 93/98/EEC, Oct. 29, 1993, Harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and 
related rights, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/consleg/pdf/1993/en_1993L0098_do_001.pdf.  
(last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
24
 William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 469 (2000).
7defined by the courts.25  The advent and growing use of the world wide web as a platform 
on which to view, copy and disseminate works of intellectual property exacerbate the 
issue and has caused much discussion and legislation,26 but the interpretation of these 
new treaties remains inconsistent.  The Internet, in this context, is an unprecedented 
challenge; its “global dimensions, which cut across territorial borders, are creating 
significant legal questions…[it] is a legal and jurisdictional ‘no-man’s land.’”27
Two treaties promulgated by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
[hereinafter WIPO] clarify that existing rights continue to apply in the digital 
environment. They also create new online rights. “To maintain a fair balance of interests 
between the owners of rights and the general public, the treaties further clarify that
countries have reasonable flexibility in establishing exceptions or limitations to rights in 
the digital environment.”28  Like the Berne Convention, then, these two “Internet 
treaties”29 do not mandate harmonization.  The application of the laws of one country’s 
system over another will, in most cases, lead to different results.30  One solution may be 
to select, based on certain criteria, from among the various potentially applicable 
systems, the laws of one system to govern the legal relationship.  “This, in essence, is the 
25
 For an excellent discussion of current choice of law issues in copyright, see Patry, id.
26
 Two treaties were concluded in 1996 at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva. 
One, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), deals with protection for authors of literary and artistic works, 
such as writings and computer programs; original databases; musical works; audiovisual works; works of 
fine art and photographs. The other, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), protects 
certain “related rights” (that is, rights related to copyright): in the WPPT, these are rights of performers and 
producers of phonograms.  There are currently 46 States party to the WCT and 43 States party to the 
WPPT.  The United States is party to both; France is party to neither.  See generally
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
27
 Raquel Xalabarder, Copyright: Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Digital Age, 8 ANN. SURV. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 79 (2002).
28
 WIPO, Copyright, Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/faq/faqs.htm#P21_3830 (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
29
 Id.
30
 Intellectual Property on the Internet: A Survey of Issues, 81, para. 277.  World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 2002.
8exercise of determining the applicable law under a private international law approach.”31
Whether and how the Internet treaties will function in an international context insofar as 
choice of law has yet to be seen, because they bow to individual nations’ implementing 
legislation.  “This means that even if the international norm-makers got the balance 
right…, there remains ample opportunity for national legislators to get it ‘wrong’…”32
In response to the existing nebulous choice of law schemes, and to attempt to deal 
with jurisdictional matters of international intellectual property matters, Professors 
Rochelle Dreyfuss and Jane Ginsburg have been working on a draft convention adapted 
from the test of the Draft Hague Convention.  In January 2001, the professors presented 
WIPO delegates with a Draft Convention On Jurisdiction And Recognition Of Judgments 
In Intellectual Property Matters [hereinafter Draft Convention], providing suggestions for 
dealing with the regulation of online content.33  The Draft Convention was intended to 
cover a gamut of intellectual property matters such as copyrights, neighboring rights, 
trademarks, and unfair competition, and was meant to cover disputes regarding violations 
occurring not only on the Internet but also in the off-line world.34
A report was drafted in March of 2004 to summarize the progress of the Draft 
Convention.  The objective of the Convention, upon its completion, is “to make exclusive 
choice of court agreements as effective as possible in the context of international 
31 Id.
32
 Jane C. Ginsburg, Book Review: Balance in International Copyright Law: The WIPO Treaties 1996: The 
WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty: Commentary and Legal 
Analysis.  By Jorg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski, 2002.  26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 201, 216 (2003).
33 See Rochelle C. Dreyfus & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention On Jurisdiction and Recognition of 
Judgments In Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002).
34 Id., at 1074.
9business.”35  The present form of the Draft Convention is a bit different from the original 
that Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg drew up in the late 90’s, however.  This is 
because, as work proceeded on drafting, it became apparent that it would not be possible 
to draw up a satisfactory text for a convention that deals with so many different 
jurisdictional models within a reasonable period of time.  “The reasons for this included 
the wide differences in the existing rules of jurisdiction in different States and the 
unforeseeable effects of technological developments, including the Internet, on the 
jurisdictional rules that might be laid down in the Convention.”36  Sections 29 and 30 of 
the revised Draft Convention deal specifically but cursorily with intellectual property and 
the Draft has yet to be passed.
A.  Choice of Law Difficulties: Rights of Privacy and Rights of Publicity
Having briefly examined the landscape of international copyright law, I will 
discuss an issue that demonstrates the variances in national copyright tenets which, 
arguably, would be difficult if not insurmountable differences in drafting a potential 
international law.  The very philosophical foundations of some intellectual property laws 
are so different as to be diametrically opposed in some instances.  For example, if 
someone takes a clear photograph of a couple strolling in a park and posts it to her 
weblog as one of several places she visited in town during vacation, the ramifications 
may be far different in the United States than in a European country.  United States law 
generally fails to be roused unless the photographer is making a profit on the image, so 
the weblogger is likely safe in posting that photograph.  
35
 Masato Dogauchi and Trevor C. Hartley, Preliminary Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court 
Agreements, Draft Report, March 2004, at 6, available at http://www.hcch.net/doc/jdgm_pd25e.pdf (last 
visited April 17, 2004).
36 Id.
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A European law, however, may be interpreted so as to be just as interested in 
protecting the privacy of the subject of the photograph as in protecting the monetary 
interest the subject has in his or her image.  Under a European law, therefore, the 
weblogger may be violating personality rights of the couple simply by dint of the fact that 
their faces are recognizable.  In a 1988 case heard by the Dutch Supreme Court, the 
magazine publication of a photograph of a couple walking in Amsterdam’s Vondelpark 
was found to infringe on the couple’s right of privacy; unbeknownst to the photographer, 
the couple were having an affair and sued the magazine for having publicized that fact.37
i. The United States
In the United States, privacy law governs a host of issues ranging from public 
disclosure of private facts to intrusion upon seclusion to “false light,” which is a tort that 
creates a cause of action when one publicly discloses a matter that places a person in a 
false light that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”38  The right of publicity falls 
into a subgroup of privacy issues called appropriation.  “One who appropriates to his own 
use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy.”39  The right of publicity was first recognized in a 1953 Second 
Circuit case, wherein the judge held that “many prominent persons (especially actors and 
ball- players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their 
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing 
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, 
buses, trains and subways.”40
37
 H.R. 1 juli 1988, NJ 1988, 1000.
38
 Rstmt (2d) of Torts § 652c (1977).
39 Id.
40 Halelan Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum Inc., 202 F. 2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
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Economic interests seem to drive the U.S. law that protects the appropriation of 
one’s likeness, at least when that person’s likeness could potentially engender a profit for 
the appropriating party.  Other aspects of privacy law are aimed at protecting a person’s 
sense of self, but these laws are often not codified and the outcomes of case law are 
inconsistent.41  In his seminal work on the rights of publicity and privacy, J. Thomas 
McCarthy stated succinctly that “while the appropriation branch of the right of privacy is 
invaded by an injury to the psyche, the right of publicity is infringed by an injury to the 
pocketbook.”42
ii. European Civil Law Traditions
In contrast with common law jurisdictions, most civil law jurisdictions have 
specific codified provisions that protect an individual's image, personal data and other 
generally private information.  Exceptions have often been carved out of these general, 
broad privacy rights when dealing with news and public figures.  Moreover, personality 
rights, somewhat akin to United States’ general privacy rights, are generally inheritable in 
European civil law jurisdictions.  
In France, personality rights are protected under Article 9 of the French Civil 
Code.  In essence, the article provides that all persons have a right to a private life and 
that a judge has discretion to ensure that privilege.43  While publicly known facts and 
images of public figures are not generally protected, use of someone's image or personal 
history has been held actionable under French law.  In 2000, for example, it was held that 
placing a person’s photograph on the Internet without that person’s acquiescence is a 
41
 Daniel J. Solove and Marc Rotenberg, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, 162 (Aspen Publishers, 2003).
42
 J. Thomas McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §5:61, at pp. 5-110 (2000).
43
 Code Civil de la France, Art. 9.  “Chacun a droit au respect de sa vie privée. Les juges peuvent, sans 
préjudice de la réparation du dommage subi, prescrire toutes mesures, telles que séquestre, saisie et autres, 
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violation of that person’s personality rights.44  In Germany, Article 2, Section 1 of the 
German Basic Law provides that “every person shall have the right to free development 
of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others….”45 The German 
personality right is closely associated with human dignity and an idea that borders on a 
right to respect.46
As suggested above with the example of the couple walking in the Vondelpark, 
not only do these different models of law rest in different philosophical foundations, they 
also have the inherent capacity of producing opposite outcomes.  This dichotomy is 
further exemplified in an analysis of moral rights doctrine.
III. Moral Rights
The above discussion of personality rights and rights of publicity are a tangent as 
well as an introduction to the broader doctrine of moral rights.  Moral rights encompass 
various strains of the protection discussed above, namely, personal interest in the creation 
of one’s authorship.  For example: a photograph may include both the personality interest 
of the subject of the photograph and the moral rights interests of the photographer 
himself.  For a painting, the equation is usually simplified to the interests of the painter, 
although there have been cases that brought into question the rights of the painter’s 
subject and commissioner.47  The principal rationalization for the protection of moral 
propres à empêcher ou faire cesser une atteinte à l'intimité de la vie privée : ces mesures peuvent, s'il y a 
urgence, être ordonnées en référé.”  Id.
44 S.A Multimania Production v. Madame Lynda L., France Cybermedia, SPPI, Esterel.  Cour d’Appel de 
Versailles, June 8 2000.
45
 Grundgesetz (Basic Law) art. 2, para. 1.
46
 Gabrielle S. Friedman and James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment Law: 
Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 257 (2003).
47
 In 1893, the painter James McNeill Whistler was commissioned to paint a lady’s portrait.  Whistler 
completed the portrait with the approval of the commissioner and exhibited it at a Parisian Salon.  The 
commissioner paid what Whistler thought an inadequate amount, after which Whistler painted out the 
lady’s head.  The commissioner sued for the restoration of the painting, inter alia, but the Court of Appeals 
and the Cour de Cassation agreed that Whistler could not be compelled to restore the portrait.  See John 
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rights is the idea that the work of art “is an extension of the artist’s personality, an 
expression of his innermost being.  To mistreat the work of art is to mistreat the artist, to 
invade his area of privacy, to impair his personality.”48
In modern history, this idea of protecting the extension of oneself can be traced 
back to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, among others.  Kant believed that an 
author’s vision can be encompassed by an action, which is an exertion of the author’s 
will, not an external, other thing.49  Indeed, an author can “find Ideas for a given concept, 
and moreover…express those Ideas in such a way that the subjective state of mind 
accompanying the concept can be communicated to others.”50
In an 1841 note addressed to the Members of a Parliamentary Committee 
responsible for examining the revision of the law on literary property, French author 
Honoré de Balzac asked the question: ‘who on earth can prevent the recognition of the 
only property that human beings create without earth or stone, and which is as durable as 
earth and stone?’”51  Balzac and fellow writer Victor Hugo founded la Société des gens 
de lettres (The Society of French Writers) in 1837, which was expanded and replaced in 
1851 by the Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique [hereinafter 
SACEM].52  This was the first collective administration or copyright collecting society 
for creators and publishers.  SACEM’s function and importance will be discussed more 
Henry Merryman and Albert E. Elsen, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS, 308.  (4th ed., Kluwer Law 
International, 2002).
48
 Merryman and Elsen, id., at 309.
49
 Nathalie C. Suhl, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne Convention: A Fictional 
Work?, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 1209 (2002).
50
 C. Aide, A More Comprehensive Soul: Romantic Conceptions of Authorship and the Copyright Doctrine 
of Moral Right, U. TORONTO L.J. 211, 215 (1990). 
51
 Florence-Marie Piriou, The Author’s Right to Intellectual Property, DIOGENES, No. 196, Vol. 49; Pg. 93 
(Dec. 2002).
52
 Caslon Analytics Profile: Copyright Collecting Societies, available at 
http://www.caslon.com.au/colsocietiesprofile.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
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below, but it is interesting to note here that struggles in copyright law insofar as 
compensation to authors, artists and their distributors do not constitute a new friction; 
they are inherent in the law’s lack of specific remuneration plan.  European countries 
have dealt differently with the concept of moral rights, but the differences amongst them 
are small compared to the dissimilar moral rights underpinnings of United States law, 
which has only very recently recognized their existence.  The divergent philosophical 
bases for these models can arguably be gleaned from their respective definitions of moral 
rights.
A. The United States
Moral rights are defined in the United States as rights “protecting a visual artist’s 
work beyond the ordinary protections of copyright.”53  The United States’ Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990, discussed below, defines moral rights as including “both integrity 
rights, which protect the work from changes that damage the artist’s or the work’s 
reputation, and attribution rights, which allow the artist to claim authorship of the work 
and to prevent the unlawful use of the author’s name in reference to a modified version of 
the work.”54  The Berne Convention’s definition of moral rights includes more breadth 
and specificity:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the 
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to 
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory 
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation.  The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the 
economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized 
by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed…55
53
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1025.  (Seventh edition, 1999).
54
 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 USCA §§ 106A, 113.
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As was discussed above, the Berne Convention allows rather broad margins for 
compliance with its Articles.  Article 6bis, in fact, includes language that exempts 
individual States from mandating that a post-mortem right remain in an author’s rights,56
an exemption the United States has taken advantage of by limiting author’s rights to his 
or her lifetime.57  Indeed, the Berne Convention’s broad margins are arguably so wide as 
to not filter out any deviance in national law whatsoever.  As one author puts it: “To truly 
comply with the Berne Convention, it may be necessary for U.S. law to depart from its 
utilitarian, market-driven tradition, and to affirmatively provide protection to authors in a 
manner consistent with that provided by other member countries of the Berne 
Convention.”58
Copyright protection in the United States stems from the Constitution59 wherein 
the goal is the promotion of the progress of “Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”60  The very purpose of intellectual property protection, then, is related 
to the benefit of the community as a whole by means of offering compensation to those 
whose work advances this progress.  The purpose is not to reward the authors, but rather 
they are rewarded as a means to the end goal of promoting public progress.  When the 
United States implemented the Berne Convention in 1989,61 over 100 years after the 
55
 Berne Convention, supra note 9, Art. 6bis (1) and (2).
56 Id., Art. 6bis (2) and (3).  “However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification 
of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights 
set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be 
maintained.  (3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be governed 
by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.”  Id.
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Convention’s inception, the consensus of the consultants was that the United States 
should and could adhere to it without making major changes in United States law.62  The 
United States had long resisted joining the Berne Union for multiple reasons, chief 
among which was its aversion to moral rights laws.63
A classic example of United States law prior to its official – albeit arguably 
inadequate -- adhesion to Berne’s moral rights principles is the 1948 New York 
Shostakovich case64 in which the plaintiffs, musical composers of international renown 
from the Soviet Union, sued a United States film company.  The composers sued for the 
erratic and out-of-context use of their music compositions in one of the company’s films, 
despite the credit they were given in connection with the abridged music.  The court 
stated that there were not any well-founded reasons to believe that the film company 
distorted the compositions nor reason to believe that the compositions had not been 
faithfully reproduced.  In trying to come to terms with the concept of moral rights, the 
court asked:  “Is the standard to be good taste, artistic worth, political beliefs, moral 
concepts or what is it to be? In the present state of our law the very existence of the right 
is not clear, the relative position of the rights thereunder with reference to the rights of 
others is not defined nor has the nature of the proper remedy been determined.”65  The 
court therefore held that, in the absence of any clear showing of the infliction of a willful 
injury or of any invasion of a moral right, it should not consider granting the plaintiff’s 
requested injunctive relief.
62 See Roundtable Discussions on United States Adherence to the Berne Convention (Nov. 25-26, 1987).
63
 “Article 6bis of Berne has generated one of the biggest controversies surrounding United States 
adherence to Berne….Article 6bis would disrupt existing business practices…”  See H.R. 4262, The House 
Report on the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, May 6, 1988.
64 Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox-Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1948).
65 Id., at 71.
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i. The Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act
Under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural 
Organization [hereinafter UNESCO], the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952 
[hereinafter the UCC] was concluded with the key objective of rapidly bringing the 
United States into multilateral copyright arrangements.66  The UCC was drafted so as to 
require as few changes in United States domestic law as necessary for the United States 
to sign on.  The UCC was therefore something of a watered-down version of the Berne 
Convention and, because several States are signatories to both, Article XVII and the 
Appendix Declaration of the UCC establish that among states party to both, the terms of 
the Berne Convention govern.  While the United States’ eventual Berne Convention 
Implementation Act [hereinafter BCIA] was far from perfectly mapped onto Article 6bis
of the Convention, the United States’ former approach to moral rights was not 
immediately construed as per se inadequate.  The Director General of WIPO at that time 
stated that, in his view, “it is not necessary for the United States…to enact statutory 
provisions on moral rights in order to comply with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.  
The requirements under this Article can be fulfilled not only by statutory provisions in a 
copyright statute but also by common law and other statutes…”67  Whether the United 
States’ treatment of moral rights was truly seen as adequate is debated; it is possible that 
various parties were so interested in the United States’ adhesion to the Convention as to 
disregard the moral rights discrepancy for the immediate future.68
66 See id.
67
 Letter from Dr. Arpad Bogsch, Director General, World Intellectual Property Organization, to Irwin 
Karp, Esq., June 16, 1987.
68
 Jon A. Baumgarten and Christopher A. Meyer, Effects of U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, ENT.
L. REP., Vol. 10, No. 11 (1989).   “The BCIA as finally enacted is designed to leave present American law 
on this subject entirely unaffected. It emphatically provides that the sum of existing U.S. legal principles 
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ii. The Visual Artists Rights Act
According to some, the United States’ adherence to the Berne Convention did not 
necessarily reflect a desire to embrace moral rights, “but rather to combat copyright 
piracy.”69  In spite of the leniency with which the United States was allowed into the 
Berne Union, an act was implemented two years after the BCIA to codify certain aspects 
of moral rights for works of visual arts; this was the Visual Artists Rights Act70
[hereinafter VARA].   
VARA went into effect on June 1, 1991.  It grants artists a continuing right to 
restrict the use and disposition of artistic works that they have sold to private citizens and 
codifies “the doctrine that artists retain inherent moral rights in their creations even after 
those works have been sold.”71 This provision shifts certain property rights from the 
person who possesses the work of art back to the person who created it, an unprecedented 
property law alteration in United States law.  VARA was drawn up and implemented 
because
[a]n artist’s professional and personal identity is embodied in each work created 
by that artist.  Each work is a part of his or her reputation.  Each work is a form of 
personal expression (oftentimes painstakingly and earnestly recorded).  It is a 
rebuke to the dignity of the visual artist that our copyright law allows distortion, 
modification and even outright permanent destruction of such efforts.72
(copyright "adaptation" rights, federal protection against "false designations," and common law doctrines of 
unfair competition, privacy, and defamation) is in full and sufficient compliance with moral rights (and 
other) provisions of the Convention, that Congress does not intend any part of the Berne Convention to be 
"self-executing," and that adherence neither expands nor reduces any such existing federal or state statutory 
or common law analogue of the rights of paternity (a creator's right to be credited as author of his or her 
work) or integrity (protection against harmful distortion or mutilation). Although the new Congress is 
expected to consider certain moral rights-related issues, and individual plaintiffs may seek relief under 
current doctrine, the BCIA was structured to assure that these questions are addressed on their own merits, 
free of claims to Berne obligations and precedents.”  Id.
69
 Merryman and Elsen, supra note 47, at 356.
70
 The Visual Artists Rights Act, supra note 54.
71
 George C. Smith, Chief minority counsel for the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and the 
Law, Jan. 1991.  See Merryman and Elsen, supra note 47, at 359.
72
 H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 15 (1990).
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Three specific rights are granted to visual artists under VARA.  They are the right of 
attribution, the right of integrity and, in the case of works of visual art of “recognized 
stature,” the right to prevent destruction.73  Although moral rights were not recognized in 
the United States prior to the enactment of VARA, some state legislatures had enacted 
moral rights laws, and a few judicial decisions accorded some moral rights protection  
under various theories of copyright, defamation, invasion of privacy, unfair competition 
and breach of contract.74  This last theory is perhaps especially important in U.S. law 
because parties’ freedom to contract to whatever terms they like is a highly prized 
privilege.  Where VARA differs significantly from its counterpart European laws is in the 
alienability of moral rights.  Under VARA, there is a provision for the waiver of moral 
rights through a signed, written agreement specifying the work and the precise uses to 
which the waiver applies.  
Congress determined that an artist’s rights “should not be absolute, but that they 
should be tempered by commercial realities, provided that provisions were enacted to 
insulate authors from being unduly influenced to give away their new-found rights.”75
According to some, VARA’s problem lies in its restrictiveness: it grants protection only 
to those artists whose works are included within VARA’s narrow definition of ‘works of 
visual art.’76 But ‘real’ moral rights do much more than just safeguard the alteration of 
73 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F. 3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995).
74
 Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks, U.S. Copyright Office, Sep. 24, 1996, available at 
www.copyright.gov/reports/exsum.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
75 Id.  See also VARA, supra note 54, 106A (e), Rights of certain authors to attribution and integrity, 
Transfer and Waiver.  Id.
76 The Visual Artists Rights Act, supra note 54, § 101.
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the original physical object; ‘real’ moral rights also guard against distortion of 
representations of the art image.77
B.  France
French law epitomizes the other end of the moral rights spectrum in terms of 
ideology.  “Moral rights arise from the French concept that a creative work contains the 
personality of its creator or author. Copyright is a property right, while the author's moral 
right is an extension of the author's character and personality. Personality is not 
transferable,”78 which is why moral rights are perpetual, inalienable, and descend to the 
heirs of the author, even after the author transfers the economic rights to another person 
or company.79   Indeed, Art. L 111-1 of the French Code of Intellectual Property provides 
that the author of a work enjoys a property right in that work by dint of the fact that it 
came from his or her soul, and that the right in that work is exclusively built-in to the 
creator’s being.80  Professor Pamela Samuelson, an intellectual property law specialist 
and scholar currently at the University of California at Berkeley, thinks that “the rights of 
the author to control the integrity of the work are considered by several European 
countries to be the key rights, and the economic rights are secondary.”81
In addition to the Berne Convention’s stipulations for the rights to integrity and 
attribution, French law provides for the right of disclosure, the right to withdraw or 
77 Jane C. Ginsburg, Art and the Law: Suppressio n and Liberty, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9, 11 
(2001).
78
 Robert B. Standler, Moral Rights of Authors in the USA (1998), available at 
http://www.rbs2.com/moral.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).
79
 French Law No. 57-298 of 11 March 1957, Arts. 6, 9, 29.
80
 French Code of Intellectual Property Law of July 1, 1992, Art. 111-1.  “L’auteur d’une oeuvre de l’esprit 
jouit sur cette oeuvre, du seul fait de sa création, d’un droit de propriété incorporelle exclusif et opposable à 
tous.”  Id.
81
 Patric Hedlund, Artists’ Rights in the Digital Universe, available at http://www.forests.com/digitfut.html
(last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
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retract and the right to reply to criticism.82  The right of disclosure83 prevents a publisher 
from modifying an author’s work, except with the author’s written permission.  The right 
to withdraw or retract allows an author whose views have changed or who is unhappy 
with his or her work to purchase any remaining copies of that work at wholesale price 
and prevent future printing.84  The right to reply to criticism gives an author the right to 
reply to a critic and to have that reply published in the same forum as the critique, thereby 
promoting discussion and debate.  The same plaintiffs from the Soviet Union in the 
Shostakovich case,85 supra, sued under the same premise in France; not surprisingly, 
perhaps, they won there.86
C. Other Traditions
Between the United States’ relative disregard for moral rights and France’s great 
emphasis thereon, there are of course other schemas that hover somewhere in between.  
One such example is Russia.  Russia’s Copyright and Adjacent Rights Act confers on an 
author the rights of use of his or her work taking into account legally adapted rights and 
interests of third persons.  “He may also prohibit third persons [from using] his work 
without his…permission.  It is obvious that [the] author may apply both existing modes 
of use of his work and those  which will come in [the] future.  With some kind of reserve 
we may say that the totality of copyrights is divided into two parts: personal property 
rights and moral rights.”87  Specifically, a Russian author is granted an inalienable right 
82 Id., Arts. 56, 32.  For an excellent discussion of French moral rights, see Thierry Joffrain, Deriving a 
(Moral) Right for Creators, 36 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 735 (2001).
83
 “Droit de divulgation,” Id., Art. 19.  
84
 “Droit de retrait ou de repentir,” Id., Art. 32.
85 Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox-Film Corp., supra note 64. 
86 Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Americane Twentieth Century, 1 Gazette du 
Palais 191 (13 Jan 1953), aff'd, D.A. Jur. 16, 80 Cour d'Appel Paris.
87
 Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge 
and Folklore, Fourth Session, Geneva, Dec. 9-17, 2002.  WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/INF/5 Add., available at 
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of recognition as the creator of the product, a right to the work’s integrity, a right to use 
the work under the author's name or a fictitious name, and a right to make the work 
public.88  While Russia’s main concern during its transitional years from communism 
may be to dampen ubiquitous pirating of intellectual property,89 their laws reflect some of 
the ideological underpinnings of European models.
In Denmark, moral rights laws are in place but the perpetuity of the right is 
questionable.  According to a Danish report in the 1990s, the perpetuity of the moral right 
of integrity was not necessarily a good idea.  “’…European law would perhaps be better 
off if the Moral rights always ran out with copyright…modern society obviously cannot 
be forced by law to respect the integrity of works only because they are called works of 
art….’”90   In contrast, Spain expressly provides for the perpetuity of moral rights.91  The 
Netherlands “decidedly does not belong to the group of countries which recognize an 
eternal moral right, with the State acting as a watchdog over the integrity of works, as 
well as with all the ensuing dangers for freedom of expression and information.”92
Clearly, there is no consistent adherence to any one moral rights scheme, even throughout 
Europe, and despite the Berne Convention’s emphasis on moral rights as the primary 
justification for copyright law.93
IV. Digitization and Digital Rights Management
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_inf5add.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 
2004).
88 See Overview Legal Framework for Activities in the Sphere of Information Technologies in the Russian 
Federation, available at www.outsourcing-russia.com/kb/ docs/legal/l16092-01.html (last visited Apr. 24, 
2004).
89 See, e.g., Erin E. Arvedlund, Hollywood Competes with the Street in Russia; To Combat Rampant DVD 
Piracy, U.S. Film Companies Cut Prices, THE N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2004.
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 Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 19 COLUM. 
V.L.A. J. OF LAW AND THE ARTS 199, 213 (1995), quoting The Report to the ALAI Congress on Moral 
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“The Internet holds out the promise of broad electronic boulevards down which 
the creative output of our age will travel effortlessly.”94  This writing focuses on the 
situation of visual art and imagery, as opposed to music and other audio content, as it 
exists in tangible form and on the Internet.  The most prevalent – and controversial –
system by which intellectual property owners are trying to protect their visual work 
online is through digital rights management [hereinafter DRM].  “DRM covers the 
description, identification, trading, protection, monitoring and tracking of all forms of 
rights usages over both tangible and intangible assets including management of rights 
holders’ relationships. Additionally, it is important to note that DRM is the ‘digital 
management of rights’ and not the ‘management of digital rights,’”95 an important 
distinction to remember since digitization does not necessarily require a new set of rules, 
just the application of old rules to new technology.  “The technologies for identifying and 
labeling content have been present for several years.  Watermarking, identifiers, and 
fingerprinting are the names given to these technologies, which have multiple functions 
and modes.”96
It is also important to note that the definition of DRM varies depending on its 
context and the author; as a relatively new concept, it has yet to be immortalized in most 
law dictionaries.97  DRM may describe a kind of rights validation to ensure that content 
being created from existing content includes the rights to do so, or it might describe the 
93 Craig Joyce, et. al., COPYRIGHT LAW 37 (5th ed. 2001).
94
 Ralph Oman, From Scourge to Savior: How Digital Technology Will Save Authorship in the Age of the 
Internet.  WIPO International Forum on the Exercise and Management of Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights in the Face of the Challenges of Digital Technology, Sevilla, Spain, 1997, at 209.  (WIPO Pub. No. 
756 (E), 1998).
95
 Renato Iannella, Digital Rights Management Architectures , D-LIB MAGAZINE, June 2001, available at 
http://www.dlib.org/dlib/june01/iannella/06iannella.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
96
 Severine Dusollier, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Information and Moral Rights, 25 
COLUM J.L. & ARTS 377 (2003).
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management of permissions to enable the usage environment to honor the rights 
associated with the content. For example, if a user only has the right to view the 
document, then DRM technology could prevent that document from being printed. DRM 
may mean a whole host of other things as well, such as digital signatures and encryption, 
which are interesting but tangential issues to this writing.98
For copyright owners, digital networks represent both a great opportunity and a 
great threat.99  The traditional copyright system has endeavored to maintain “balance 
between protecting creators’ property rights and the exclusive right to control use of 
copies of their work, and the public good in fair access to and use of such materials.”100
That balance is now more precarious because of digital technologies and the manner in 
which they have changed how people access and utilize information.101
The digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights of copyright owners, 
and as such, necessitates protection against devices that undermine copyright 
interests.  In contrast to the analog experience, digital technology enables pirates 
to reproduce and distribute perfect copies of works – at virtually no cost at all to 
the pirate.  As technology advances, so must our laws.102
“The key difference between digital and analog identifiers lies in the ease of 
embedding any digital information in digital content.  The information can be 
permanently, invisibly and indelibly attached to a digital copy.”103
A.  Watermarking
97
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98
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Watermarking is often cited when discussing copyright protection technologies.  
A watermark is information embedded on an image that is often, but not always, 
imperceptible.104  Generally, digital watermarking serves two primary uses: first, to 
control use of the work by placing instructions in the watermark that limit the uses a 
device may make of the work; second, to identify copyrighted works by providing 
identifying information in the watermarks.105  The embedded information can be 
extracted by special software.  For example, the first type of watermark, a ‘watermarking 
detector,’ can, when applied to content that is suspected to have been pirated, check if the 
content bears the watermark and thereby prove or disprove the suspicion.106  The second 
type of watermark, a ‘transaction watermark’ allows the establishment of a link between 
an arbitrary user with the content he or she ‘touched.’107  This practice, also called 
‘fingerprinting,’ is widely used “by photo agencies, who place their name or logo on a 
copy of a photo for promotional purposes, and then deliver the picture without the 
marking once payment has been made.”108
B. Corbis Corporation and DRM
Corbis Corporation, created by Bill Gates in the early 1990s, provides services for 
licensing images in advertising, books, newspapers, magazines, on TV, on the Internet 
and in films.109 It offers solutions that enable publishers, advertising and design agencies 
104
 Jeffrey P. Cunard, Keith Hill and Chris Barlas, Current Developments in the Field of Digital Rights 
Management, World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on Copyright and Related 
Rights, Tenth Session, Nov. 3-5, 2003, at 29, available at 
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105
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L. & POL’Y 4. (2003).
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107 Id., at 30.
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to enhance their products with photography, fine art, illustrations and footage by 
managing the intellectual property rights of the copyright holders of these various forms 
of visual content.  “In a world where the arrival of digital technology has brought serious 
challenges to copyright protection of music and film, Corbis is that rare thing: a business 
that believes copyright protection and commercial use of the Internet can peaceably 
coexist.…”110  Steve Davis, an attorney and the chief executive officer of Corbis, notes 
that “in today’s online market, you can’t be in business without spending an enormous 
amount of time thinking about how to protect intellectual property: how to restrict access 
to it, how to exploit and market it.”111  For a large percentage of its content, which is 
created expressly for licensing through its website, Corbis buys images on a contract 
basis and licenses them to organizations or individuals; photographers retain the 
copyright in their work.112
i. Fine Art at Corbis
A portion of Corbis’s website hosts an array of fine art.  “From masterpieces of 
world art to the obscurities of well-known artists, the Corbis collection brings together 
the most comprehensive selection of art images in the world.”113  The first licensing deal 
Corbis made was with a collection of classical paintings called Archivo Iconografico; in 
fact, Mr. Gates initially targeted museums and art galleries based on his belief that there 
would soon be a market for digital images of cultural objects.114  Mr. Davis recalls that, 
in 1993, “there was no way that people could handle or pay for digital media from their 
110
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desktops…. I remember a conference in Cannes when Phillipe de Montebello, director of 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, said: ‘I will never, never, never, have a 
digital machine in my museum.’”115  Now kiosks and interactive displays are 
commonplace.  
Because of countries’ different copyright laws and the range of contractual 
relationships between rights managers and rights holders, any given “rights-managed” 
image offered by Corbis will include a unique menu of restrictions.  A digitized 
photograph by Brett Weston, a contemporary photographer, for example, includes 
restrictions such as “Not available for use in clip art or clip photography product; Not 
available for fine art print use (limited editions of art value); and Image may not be 
cropped under any circumstances.”116  Corbis’s image of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, 
on the other hand, stipulates that the image is “Not available for display as artwork on 
plasma screens, LCD screens or other electronic televisions or monitors; and not for use 
by or for manufacturers or sellers of digital art products or digital display products.”117
Perhaps the rational here is that the plasma screen would too closely replicate the original 
artwork, although, in terms of other reproductive media, poster replications of the Mona 
Lisa are widely available, begging the question whether the ban on digitization will 
endure.  
C. Moral Rights and Digitization
Inherent in this discussion of new technologies and the ability to view, use, and 
disseminate cultural images in digital formats is the fact that these images are 
114
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transformed from one media to another when they are digitized and essentially changed.  
Whether a digital image’s very existence is acceptable when discussed in the context of 
moral rights is often skipped over when the analysis involves when and how a digital 
image may be used.  Copyright owners of priceless works of art who have traditionally 
been generous in allowing museums to produce glossy catalogues that include an image 
of their paintings have been hesitant to allow museums to upload those same images to a 
website.118
The digitization of works on media such as CD-ROMs or computer memories and 
transmission of these works over telecommunications networks are 
revolutionizing the exploitation of creative products. This explains the current 
trend to transfer protection to producers, a development that has definitely 
gathered speed with the new creative techniques and is tending to distort the 
function of the droit d'auteur as the eighteenth-century philosophers conceived it-
-a natural property at the service of the creative mind.119
Any image incorporated into a multimedia platform must, by definition, be 
digitized. “The downside to digitization is that the content is reduced to a source code 
comprising a configuration of 1s and 0s. In this state, the information may be easily 
manipulated, making it very simple for either the developer or the end user to alter the 
original work.”120  In addition to the ease with which an unprotected image may be 
altered, the digitization scenario begs the question whether the artist is or should be at 
ease with the transformation of his work into “1s and 0s.”  Other aspects of an image will 
likely be altered during digitization.  Its size and most likely its color tones will be 
118
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altered.  This could ostensibly amount to derogatory treatment, although, even on an 
international scale, “[t]here is a dearth of case law in this area.”121
Perhaps, though, there are new moral rights being inadvertently granted by dint of 
digitization: “[C]opyright law grants a new right of authentication, a digital counterpart 
of the moral right, or a right of attribution, akin to the continental moral right, in 
countries, such as the United States, where such a right did not heretofore exist.”122
Professor Ginsburg made the point that the DMCA “may contain the seeds of a more 
general attribution right: with sufficient ingenuity and effort, these seeds might be made 
to germinate…. Inclusion of the author’s name in protected copyright management 
information suggest that the copyright law finally affords authors of all works…a right to 
recognition of their authorial status.”123  The right of attribution, discussed above, entitles 
an author to claim authorship in his or her work.  In the digital sphere, the technological 
link between the digital document and the author’s name could provide that right without 
accompanying legislation.  Ensuring that it is the author’s name to which an image links 
instead of the identity of the producer, however, could be a challenge.124
The upside to the above predicament is that, although “new forms of 
communication are a threat to the exclusive copyrights…[they are] also a big possibility 
for gaining more markets, which could become a key to much more compensation.”125
The compensation issue begs the question: who is being compensated.  If it is the artist 
himself, then his consent to digitization is one set of issues; if it is an artist’s agent, heir 
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or benefactor, that is another.  The issue has not been addressed consistently under the 
auspices of moral rights or author’s rights.  While nations like France deem these rights 
to be inalienble so that no agent could pressure an artist to give them up, the potential 
benefits of digitization understandably prevent a “right against digitization” from 
becoming part of a moral rights code.  That being said, the potential harm of digitization 
in terms of a work’s integrity and susceptibility to piracy has not been directly addressed, 
but there are many interested parties who are “alarmed about the potential for fraud and 
artistic counterfeit in the wildwest world of digital commerce.”126  Copyright law should 
ensure that authors, and not producers or distributors, have the same type of control with 
DRM that they enjoy with tangible works.127
D. Museums and DRM Options
Museums preserve cultural integrity and diversity and fulfil their mission of 
exhibiting their collections to national and international audiences.128  Whether part of 
that mission includes the usage of digital technology to disseminate information and 
imagery over the Internet is uncertain.  Many museums whose collections include 
manuscripts, photographs, paintings, sculpture and cultural artifacts have digitized 
images of these works and displayed them on the Internet.  While digitization can be 
expensive and technically complex,129 it also holds the possibility of promoting economic 
development, academic research and education.  Furthermore, it could enable museums 
to manage and exploit their collections and to make their cultural riches available to any 
126
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person in the general community with access to a computer network, a result that is 
probably very compatible with the mission statement of most museums.
While many very laudable goals may be reached by digitizing collections, there 
are intellectual property concerns about the process that have not been fully addressed.  
“These concerns have sometimes paralyzed those who would otherwise enthusiastically 
embrace the new technologies…with many museums, rights administration procedures 
are currently based on a physical, print model of publication and distribution, and do not 
envisage the possibility of digital images of the works.”130  Digitizing a collection 
ostensibly allows a museum to reach a wider clientele, to obtain assistance in managing 
rights and reproduction, to gain national or international promotion and marketing 
services, and to thereby increase revenue.131  Possible disadvantages include the loss of 
control in various important capacities, such as the selection of licensed content, the 
quantity and quality of the image, and pricing decisions.132  “The cultural embodiments 
of learning and entertainment are already spinning inexorably across the Internet which 
knows no national boundaries.”133
Museum digitization projects clearly raise policy, technical and financial issues 
that should be addressed before museum images are displayed in a digital environment.134
Cultural heritage institutions are developing new projects for online licensing of their 
collections.  The Art Museum Image Consortium [hereinafter AMICO], a not-for-profit 
organization of institutions with collections of art, collaborates to enable educational use 
130 Id.
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of museum multimedia.135  It provides a database documenting over 100,000 digitized 
artworks from several North American museums, “highlighting the creative output of 
cultures around the world, from prehistoric to contemporary times, and covering the 
complete range of expressive forms. Cultures and time periods represented range from 
contemporary art, Native American and Inuit art, to ancient Greek, Roman, and Egyptian 
works, along with Japanese and Chinese works.”136
Another model of a digital museum collection is Russia’s Hermitage Museum.  
With the collaboration of IBM Corp., The Hermitage has a fully-searchable online 
catalog of its collection.  A visitor to the website can search or browse the entire 
collection; once an image is located, the viewer can select from a menu of screen 
resolutions and angles at which the painting or artwork was photographed.  The usage 
policy, to which the website viewer must navigate on his own, is succinct:  
The contents of this site, including all images and text, are for personal, 
educational, non-commercial use only. The contents of this site may not be 
reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form without the written permission of the 
State Hermitage Museum. Images on this web site have been invisibly 
watermarked; any attempt to remove the watermarks from these images is 
expressly forbidden.137
The AMICO model uses the preemptive form of digital rights management, 
wherein it allows access to the images only through a specific contract agreement with an 
educational entity or institution.  The Hermitage model allows access to anyone who has 
access to the Internet.  Like the Corbis website, the Hermitage Library transfers the onus 
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of copyright infringement responsibility to the end user.  For example, it does not 
technologically prevent someone from right-clicking on an image and saving it to her 
hard drive or using it as wallpaper, which would probably be an acceptable usage of the 
image, but it has the technological capacity to find out that kind of information and
thereby bring suit against any entity that uses its images in a fashion inconsistent with its 
terms.  
Another model is demonstrated by an older system used by the Getty Museum for
its website.138  In 2002, the Museum implemented a copyright scheme whereby all 
images on the J. Paul Getty Museum website larger than a thumbnail contained a 
watermark stating who owns the image; a click would bring the user to the Getty 
copyright clause.139  “We protect what we need to protect;” other than that, “we 
encourage you to rip, mix and burn. After all, it's your cultural heritage.”140  The Getty’s 
website currently operates similarly to that of the Hermitage.
E. Non-Museum Art and DRM
Another possibility in licensing digital content is to go through a collective rights 
organization.  For example, the Media Image Resource Alliance [hereinafter MIRA], 
based in New Jersey, is a joint project of the Copyright Clearance Center and the 
Association of Media Photographers.  The VERDI project [Very Extensive Rights Data 
Information Project] is a European multimedia information and licensing network 
between nationally-managed clearance services designed to facilitate rights trading.  By 
linking together these existing rights clearance centers, “VERDI will create a simple and 
138
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cost-effective Internet-based service for multimedia rights clearance. VERDI will provide 
the producer the services and information he needs for obtaining the right to use pre-
existing content in his multimedia production.”141
F. Collecting Societies
Collecting societies are private societies established by authors and proprietors of 
neighboring rights with the objective of protecting their rights collectively in areas of use 
where individual collection is not possible.  Most collecting societies perform four basic 
functions.  They license works in which they hold the copyright or for which they act as 
agent on behalf of their members for specific uses; they monitor use and collect revenues; 
they distribute revenues as royalties to members; and they enter into reciprocal 
arrangements with foreign collecting societies to collect and distribute local royalties to 
foreign rightsholders and to receive and distribute royalties earned overseas to local 
rightsholders.142
In the majority of contexts in which it is defined and discussed, collecting 
societies are more important to the music industry than to that of visual arts.  As 
mentioned above, the first collecting society, SACEM, was formed in France in the mid-
1800s.  It served as a model for other societies such as the UK Performing Rights Society 
(PRS), German Gesellschaft fur Musikalische Auffuhrungs (GEMA) and Australia's 
Australian Performing Right Association (APRA).143  The American Society of 
Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP) was established in 1914 and has flourished.  
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Despite the number of collecting societies, “there is no single collective rights 
management body covering all countries or all of the web. As with most commercial and 
intellectual property law there is instead a patchwork: resplendent in places, threadbare or 
moth-eaten in others.”144  Reciprocity is encouraged by the Confederation Internationale 
des Societes Auteurs & Compositeurs [hereinafter CISAC], the International Federation 
of Reproduction Rights Organizations, the Bureau International des Sociétés Gérant les 
Droits D'Enregistrement et les Reproduction Mecanique and other bodies.  CISAC has 
been active in encouraging international standards for the identification of copyright 
works, exchange of rights information between databases and the development of 
electronic copyright management and digital rights management systems.
Founded in 1926, CISAC is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. Its 
headquarters are established in Paris, with regional offices in Buenos Aires and 
Singapore.145  CISAC works towards increased recognition and protection of creator's 
rights.  As of January 2004, it represents 209 authors' societies in 109 countries. CISAC 
indirectly represents more than 2 million creators, covering all the artistic repertoires: 
music, drama, literature, audio-visual works, graphic and visual arts, although income 
from music currently represents well over 90% of all revenue.  Most of the international 
academic studies of the current state of collecting societies has focused on the music 
sector, presumably because of the interaction of bundles of rights and uses and the size of 
the market.146  Its activities are aimed at improving the position of authors and 
composers, and at enhancing the quality of the collective administration of their rights 
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throughout the world. With the growing importance of the Internet and its challenge to 
the administration of authors' rights, CISAC reinforces its role as a service-driven 
organization.  Insofar as a conduit through which an artist’s moral rights might be 
enforced, collecting societies seem to play a very limited role, even in France.  There, 
courts have been extremely hesitant to accept commencement of legal actions of persons 
other than family members of an author or artist.147  In the United States, of course, moral 
rights, if they exist at all, expire with the artist.
The Artists’ Rights Society [hereinafter ARS], an American company, is an 
affiliate of CISAC.  ARS is the “preeminent copyright, licensing, and monitoring 
organization for visual artists in the United States. Founded in 1986, ARS represents the 
intellectual property rights interests of over 30,000 visual artists (painters, sculptors, 
photographers, architects and others) and estates of visual artists from around the 
world.”148  The current struggle regarding collecting societies revolves around the advent 
of the Internet and the new role of digital rights management in a realm the collecting 
societies have overseen for so long.  An international symposium is taking place in 
Switzerland at the end of June of this year to address the very topic; its title is Digital 
Rights Management: The End of Collecting Societies?.  The objective of this symposium 
is to take “a critical look at the challenging and equally important issues of content 
distribution in the digital era.  The focus is placed upon the controversial relationship 
between DRM and Collecting Societies.”149
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G. Photographs of Paintings and Digitization of Photographs of Paintings: The 
Bridgeman Case and the Public Domain
As mentioned above in the discussion of the importance of moral rights for 
imagery on the Internet, much of this discussion is based on the interest of the author in 
his work, assuming that there is one.  In many cases, however, when a work falls into the 
public domain, or when there are no provisions for the continuity of a deceased artist’s 
moral rights, there is no moral rights law with which an entity must tangle.  While French 
law passes some moral rights from the artist onto his or her heirs, many countries do not; 
the artist’s moral rights interest in the work ends upon his or her death.  For this reason, 
some museums with older works do not need to grapple with the questions like whether 
the painter of a 13th century icon painting would have been horrified at the digitization of 
his work; he is not alive and possibly anonymous.  The vast majority of museums, 
however, do need to deal with it to some extent.  The Louvre’s online image of Leonardo 
da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, for example, includes a copyright line that reads:  “R.M.N./H. 
Lewandowski - Le Mage – Gattelet.”  
The R.M.N. stands for la Réunion des Musées Nationaux, a French institution that 
was founded in 1895 to raise and administer the funds required for the acquisition of 
works of art by national collections.150  In the 1930s, it took over the publication of 
postcards, guides and catalogues for the national museums’ permanent collections and the 
temporary exhibitions organized by the R.M.N.  This publishing activity — extended to 
audiovisual publications, and, since 1993, to multimedia — has flourished in recent years 
and the R.M.N.’s structure has changed accordingly.  Today, the R.M.N. also 
disseminates cultural material, striving to reconcile its mission as a public service with 
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market forces.  The three names that follow the “R.M.N.” attached to the image of the 
Mona Lisa are photographers who are members of the Photographic Agency of the 
R.M.N.151  In this sense, the Louvre website operates much like that of Corbis.  The 
original artist is credited, of course, but the copyright in that image of the Mona Lisa is 
ascribed to the R.M.N. and these photographers.
The reproduction of fine art in new media, such as digitized images on the 
Internet, poses new problems for traditional rules.  The United States was given some 
controversial guidance on the principle in the 1999 case Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel 
Corporation.152  The Bridgeman Art Library is a British company that acquires 
photographs of works of art in the public domain and then licenses the use and 
reproduction of these photographs.153  Corel is a Canadian corporation that sells computer 
software products, one of which was a set of seven CD-ROMs containing seven hundred 
photographic images of public domain paintings by European artists.  Corel claimed to 
have obtained the images from a source other than Bridgeman, but Bridgeman filed suit 
against Corel for the 120 images that looked identical to those in the Bridgeman 
collection, and for which Bridgeman claimed copyright.  At issue was whether a 
photograph of a two-dimensional painting is copyrightable, and the court ultimately 
decided it is not.154
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While this decision’s ramifications may be quite broad, they will not necessarily 
be injurious to the image houses that currently license the photographs.  The two most 
fertile corporations in this domain are Getty Images and Corbis.  Getty Images recently 
acquired the Bridgeman Library’s images and now offers them in digital format for 
rights-managed licensing. While Getty Images may not be able to claim to own the 
copyright in these images, as per the Bridgeman Art Library decision, it has the 
advantage of having access to the Bridgeman photographs, which are of very high 
quality.  For an amateur to take a similar photograph would be difficult at best; to locate 
the painting and gain permission to do so would likely be even more of a challenge.  One 
of the Bridgeman Art Library’s images was the Mona Lisa.  A high-quality image of the 
Mona Lisa is now available on Getty Image’s website for licensing.  The text below the 
image reads “The Bridgeman Art Library (rights-managed).”
V. Amedeo Modigliani
At the beginning of this writing, I presented three possible venues at which to 
view one of Amedeo Modigliani’s paintings of Jeanne Hébuterne. The first was the 
website www.artnet.com, a “place to buy, sell and research fine art online.”155  Its Online 
Gallery Network comprises images from over 1,300 galleries, 36,000 works and 13,000 
artists from around the globe. “The Network serves dealers and art buyers alike by 
providing a survey of the market and its pricing trends, as well as the means to 
communicate instantly, inexpensively and globally.”156  While the images at artnet do not 
have an attached copyright line and generally seem to be downloadable, there is a clear 
Terms and Conditions policy on the website.  Among its provisions, artnet claims:
155 See www.artnet.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
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You may not modify, create derivative works from, participate in the transfer or 
sale of, post on the World Wide Web, or in any way exploit the Site or any 
portion thereof for any public or commercial use without the express written 
permission of artnet.com. You may download one (1) copy of Content from the 
Site for your personal use, provided that you maintain all copyright, attribution 
and other notices contained in such Content, including without limitation 
trademarks and service marks of artnet and its affiliates or the copyright holder 
identified in the individual Content's copyright notice. You acknowledge that you 
do not acquire any ownership rights by downloading copyrighted material. You 
are responsible for complying with all applicable laws, rules and regulations 
regarding your use of any such downloaded Content. In the event of any permitted 
copying, redistribution or publication of material from the Site, no changes in or 
deletion of author attribution, trademark, legend or copyright notice shall be 
made.157
The next place I suggested to look at the digitized image of this Modigliani 
painting was through the Gettyimages website.  A Getty photographer, Odd Andersen, 
photographed the painting being hung on a wall at Christie’s auction house on January 
29, 2004.  The caption to the image reads:  
LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM: A Christie's auction house porter adjusts 
Italian painter Amedeo Modigliani's “Portrait de Jeanne Hebuterne,” estimated 
value 5-7 million pounds (7.3-10.2 million euros) in London, 29 January 2004. 
The painting is part of Christie's 19th & 20th century art evening sales week, 
expected to fetch a total of 75 million pounds (109.5 million euros)…Restrictions: 
This image is only available in Getty Images offices in the United Kingdom, 
United States, Germany (Austria, Switzerland via Germany), Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Australia.
In addition to these specific restrictions for this image, Gettyimages states in its 
Terms and Conditions section that:
All elements of Getty Images websites, including, but not limited to, the general 
design and the Content, are protected by trade dress, copyright, moral rights, 
trademark and other laws relating to intellectual property rights. Except as 
explicitly permitted under this or another agreement with Getty Images or one of 
its subsidiaries or content providers, no portion or element of this website or its 
Content may be copied or retransmitted via any means and this website, its 
157 See Artnet, Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.artnet.com/about/antscs.asp (last 
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Content and all related rights shall remain the exclusive property of Getty Images 
or its third party content providers unless otherwise expressly agreed. Content 
(including photographic images) purchased or otherwise acquired by you via the 
Site may only be used by you for personal, non-commercial purposes (i.e., not for 
re-sale or re-distribution) and may not be duplicated or otherwise reproduced or 
altered by you.158
I also noted that, because the painting did not sell for the reserve price set by the 
auction house, it was probably returned to the previous owner.  Perhaps it is hanging in 
his or her home.  What would Amedeo Modigliani think of his paintings being digitized
and exhibited in these various fora?  There is no text attached to the images that explains 
who his subject is or why he painted her.  He painted this particular piece in oil; would he 
have condoned this work being uploaded onto the Internet at all?  Is it a foregone 
conclusion that web dissemination of an image of art is a benefit to society?  A benefit to 
the artist?  
Amedeo Modigliani was born in Livorno, Italy, in July 1884. Both sides of his 
family were Sephardic Jews. His father Flaminio was an unsuccessful entrepreneur who 
had a small money-changing business, and his mother, Eugenia, ran an experimental 
school.159  Modigliani moved to Paris in 1906, at the age of 22.  He struggled for several 
years with periods of poverty, bouts of depression, and difficult relationships.  In July of 
1917, he met Jeanne Hébuterne, who was then aged nineteen.  The two lived together 
between the French Riviera and Paris and had a child together the following year.  Jeanne 
became pregnant again in May of 1919.  A few months later, Amedeo became very ill.  In 
mid-January of 1920, he was bedridden and comatose, suffering from tubercular 
meningitis. He died on January 24, 1920, without regaining consciousness. There was an 
158 See Gettyimages, Site Terms and Conditions, available at 
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elaborate funeral, attended by the whole of the Montmartre neighborhood of Paris. 
Jeanne, who had been taken to her parents’ house, threw herself out of a fifth floor 
window two days after Modigliani's death, killing both herself and her unborn child.160
    Amedeo and Jeanne’s surviving daughter, also named Jeanne, created the 
“Archives Légales Amedeo Modigliani” [Legal Archives of Amedeo Modigliani] in 
1983, a cultural association registered with the Paris Police Prefecture.  The creation of 
this organization, upon the decision of Jeanne Modigliani, aimed to classify and protect 
the works of the artist.  For 15 years, the association has been working along these lines, 
faithful to its initial objective: to safeguard the worldwide spread of the knowledge of the 
artist's works and the historical and esthetic information regarding them.161  The website 
has an image archive of thumbnails for possible licensing.  Modigliani’s estate is not 
handled by the United States’ Artists Rights Society, as are many other famous artists; 
however some of his works are available, inter alia, in the Bridgeman Art Library 
collection, discussed above, as well as at various museum websites,162 and in printed 
catalogues.163
The reason I believe this detailed promenade through the significance and 
reinvention of Modigliani’s Portrait of Jeanne Hébuterne is important to this writing is 
that it demonstrates the frenetic nature of current rights management systems with regard 
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to copyright.  Whether an artwork is in the public domain, whether the artist is alive, the 
nationality of the artist, and the country in which an artwork is infringed upon in some 
manner are only starting points to an analysis of the correct application of law.  To truly 
harmonize copyright protection for visual imagery would take more than a loosely-
worded international treaty since deep-rooted cultural and moral tenets regarding the 
value of a creative work come into play and those values vary dramatically, even 
amongst parties to the Berne Convention.
Before digital rights management systems become more sophisticated, I would 
hope that WIPO and other international organizations that are involved in the regulation 
of the Internet consider that there is no fast way to streamline copyright protection for 
images on the Internet.  The blessing and curse of the Internet is its ubiquity.  The 
blessing and curse of advanced technology is the ease with which imagery can be 
transformed and manipulated.  The challenge inherent in this situation arises from a 
single worldwide platform on which to view digital imagery but a gamut of different 
ideologies as to how and whether those images should be available. Who, then, should 
make the ultimate decisions?  “The parameters of the debate regarding copyright law 
have historically been shaped, and continue to be shaped, by legislators and lobbyists, 
with little involvement by others.  This trend persists in the debate regarding copyright in 
cyberspace.”164    This, among many other issues, highlights that those who have an 
interest in the integrity and distribution of their creative works are not often the same 
people who have authority or power of persuasion insofar as the law regarding this issue 
is concerned.  
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Technology continues to reinvent itself.  Bill Gates, Corbis’s owner, has 
approximately 30 flat-screen monitors in his Medina home to show digital pictures.  
Gates and his wife Melinda “generally shuffle the images displayed on these monitors 
every week.  Nearly always they come from Corbis’s stock of 70 million pictures.  He 
likes sunsets and pictures to do with the Second World War, golf, sailing and Nobel Prize 
winners.”165  The possibility of viewing beautifully digitized artwork in this fashion is an 
amazing triumph for visual technologies.  Indeed, “[t]he commodification of images of 
public domain works of art makes it possible for us to adorn our every day lives with 
images of fine art.”  Interestingly, most ‘fine art’ images on the Corbis website, like the 
Mona Lisa mentioned above, and such as a Modigliani painting of his wife, stipulate that 
the image is not available for display on big screen media.  It is my hope that this kind of 
restriction will remain intact.
As an individual who has had the opportunity to work at museums, an auction 
house, and an image bank, I believe that most, if not all, individuals affiliated with these 
entities desire a copyright and DRM scheme that satisfies the interests of all parties. I 
also believe that the conversation could be fleshed out insofar as artists themselves are 
concerned; it is essential to keep an artist’s moral rights a substantial part of the 
discussion, since they are the people whose creativity is exploited (in terms of dollars) or 
exhibited (in terms of allowing the public to enjoy their creations).
VI. Conclusion
The foundational contention woven throughout the whole of this writing is that 
the copyright equation is not a horizontal one between rights holders and the public.  
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There is also an inherent element of the equation that should guarantee that artists retain 
some measure of control over their creations.  Copyright has long been available to give 
rights holders the ability to prevent unauthorized uses of their content.  Standing alone, 
the law cannot prevent illicit uses, regardless of whether they are undertaken unfairly or 
legitimately.166 In other words, “the moral content and legitimacy of a digital copyright 
regime will depend on the perception that the law is obeyed.”167 The ultimate aim of 
using technical measures to manage delivery of intellectual property must be “to balance 
the requirements of rights owners to control and protect the distribution of content with 
the interest of consumers to have access to that content…unless copyright is to be 
abandoned as a mechanism for trading in intellectual property entirely, it will be essential 
to find an answer to this paradox.”168 The scope of copyright protection still varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  “Confronted with this legal diversity and the technical ease 
for infringement offered by digital media, copyright holders [and artists themselves] may 
be reluctant to make protected material available on-line.”169
I propose that international copyright law is fragmented and will remain so in the 
immediate future.  As was noted almost ten years ago: “Copyright from its historic 
beginnings centered around works of literature and art in the traditional sense of the 
word; moral rights have been developed with this in mind…we must adapt our positions 
to the new situation, in order to save the principle as such.”170 While an eventual 
international plan may eventually come into being, the balance between rightsholders and 
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consumers must be equated while taking into account the substantial rights of the original 
authors, whether they hold the economic-based copyright or not, and therein lies a very 
difficult equation to balance on the international scale.  Moral rights are not dead yet, and
it is incumbent upon current policymakers to balance the copyright equation between 
rights holders, end-users, and, quite importantly, artists.
